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Abstract – A number of European fishing fleets have been regulated through a combination of quota and eﬀort (sea
days) controls since 2004. These two regulation schemes are, however, interrelated, i.e. a given quota limit will neces-
sarily determine the eﬀort used and vice versa. A bioeconomic feedback model is presented which takes this causality
between eﬀort and harvest control into account, and switches back and forth between these two regulation schemes
depending on which is the binding rule. The model is based on biological stock projection, and quotas are set using the
Pope approximation while an economic production function is used to estimate the harvest when the eﬀort is binding.
The economic response of the fleet is modelled through a dynamic investment/disinvestment module which evaluates
the change in the fleet capacity given the economic outcome of the fishery. A simple example is presented for the
Danish seiners catching cod in the North Sea. The model has been constructed as part of the 6th framework project
“Operational Evaluation Tools for Fisheries Management Options (EFIMAS)”.
Key words: Combined quota and eﬀort control / Bio-economic modelling / FLR (Fisheries Laboratory in language R)
1 Introduction
With the introduction of the 2002 reform (EC 2002) of the
Common Fishery Policy (CFP) for EU waters, eﬀort control
was introduced alongside quota control and limited entry to
the fishery in form of capacity restrictions (fishing licenses).
The reasons to include eﬀort control parallel to quotas are (i)
considering the large overcapacity of the European fishing fleet
quotas do not seem adequate to limit the actual amount of fish
being caught, and (ii) the multi-species nature of most fisheries
often results in over-exploitation and subsequent discarding of
some species, which may to some degree be avoided by eﬀort
control.
The assumption that harvest and eﬀort are interrelated is
implicit in the introduction of eﬀort-regulation, i.e. a given
observed harvest will necessarily determine the eﬀort used,
and correspondingly, a given eﬀort will determine the harvest.
Thus, given the combined quota and eﬀort regulation, one of
the two will always be the limiting factor which determines the
actual harvest.
It is therefore important to acknowledge the issue of
causality between regulation methods when modelling the ef-
fects of a given management scheme. This paper presents a
bio-economic simulation model developed with the aim to as-
sess the economic as well as the biological eﬀects of recovery
plans including eﬀort control, taking the causal relationship
a Corresponding author: ah@foi.dk
between the quota restrictions and the additional sea day lim-
itations into account. The model is thus able to switch be-
tween harvest and eﬀort control of the fishery. This switch-
ing mechanism is an improvement of existing bio-economic
models which usually consider either harvest or eﬀort con-
trol. As such, the model presented in this paper opens up for
more realistic and complete assessments of the new CFP. The
model is based on previous work (Hoﬀ and Frost 2006) where
a bio-economic model for dynamic fleet capacity change was
developed in connection with the 6th framework programme
EFIMAS (Operational Evaluation Tools for Fisheries Manage-
ment Options, EFIMAS 2007).
As an example the model uses Danish seiners catching cod
in the North Sea as a specific case study employing the recov-
ery scheme for the North Sea cod set by the European Com-
mission in 2004 (EC 2004). It is well-known that the cod stock
in the North Sea has been steadily decreasing since the early
1970s, and it is at present at the lowest observed level over
the last century (ICES 2005). The cod spawning stock biomass
(SSB) should be at least SSBlim = 70 000 t in order to reproduce
itself, and observing that the biomass was ∼50 000 t in 2005 it
is clear that the stock may suﬀer from reduced reproductive
capacity. In 2004, the European Commission thus introduced
a specific recovery plan for the North Sea Cod (EC 2004) in
which the harvest and eﬀort control rules were formulated with
the aim to increase the stock to above the precautionary level
of SSBPa = 150 000 t. The harvest rule states that the catch in
Article published by EDP Sciences
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a given year must be set at a level which allows the SSB of
cod to increase by at least 30% relative to the previous year
until the precautionary level is reached. Moreover, the fishing
mortality rate must not exceed 0.65. These aims are enforced
through combined TAC and eﬀort regulation, the latter stating
that seine vessels must not have more than 22 active fishing
days in the North Sea per month.
A large part (37 out of a total of 62 vessels in 2003) of the
Danish seine fleet operates in the North Sea at a full- or part-
time basis. The Danish seiners generally target cod and plaice,
and the landings value of cod for this fleet segment constituted
on average ∼25% of the total landings value for this segment
in the period 2002–2004. The Danish seiners take ∼10% of
the total Danish cod landings from the North Sea, while the
Danish share of cod in the North Sea constitutes ∼20% of the
North Sea TAC for the European Union. Thus, the Danish sein-
ers take ∼2% of the EU TAC of cod in the North Sea. As such
the Danish seine fleet will not have any significant influence
on the state of the cod stock in the North Sea. The reduction of
cod quotas resulting from the recovery programme discussed
above may, however, have a significant influence on the econ-
omy of the Danish seiners fishing in the North Sea.
2 Methods
The model includes a biological and an economic oper-
ation module, the former simulating the stock assessment and
establishment of quotas each year, and the latter simulating the
economic dynamics of the fleet, i.e. fleet catches and earnings,
fleet eﬀort and investment/disinvestment in capital.
The model is generally an improvement of existing bio-
economic models (see e.g., Skjold et al. 1996; Danielsson et al.
1997; Garza-Gil et al. 2003, 2006; Da-Rocha and Gutiérrez
2004, 2006) in the sense that it is possible to take parallel quota
and eﬀort regulation into account. In this respect, the model is
an important contribution to the ongoing work of assessing ex-
isting and proposed management schemes. As such, it should
be kept in mind that although the model presented below fo-
cuses on evaluating the eﬀect on one fleet of the cod recovery
programme in the North Sea, it can easily be applied to other
scenarios.
The model is initiated in each year y (y > 1) of the sim-
ulation period by evaluating the number of vessels NVyFl (ca-
pacity) in the fleet1 Fl at the start of year y, based on previous
years total profit (of all species being caught by the fleet):
NVyFl = NV
y−1
Fl + ΔNV
y
Fl when NV
MIN
Fl  NV
y
Fl  NV
MAX
Fl .(1)
Where
ΔNVyFl =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
I+Fl · ΠyFl
V InFl
;
I−Fl · ΠyFl
VOutFl
;
Π
y
Fl  0
Π
y
Fl < 0;
Π
y
Fl =
(1 − (1 + r)LT )
r
·
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 11 + LGTFl
LGTFl∑
i=0
P(y−1)−LAGFl−iFl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1 In the present case the “fleet” specifies that part of the Danish
seine fleet that operates specifically in the North Sea.
NVMAXFl and NV
MIN
Fl are the maximum and minimum number
of vessels allowed in the fleet. ΠyFl is the average discounted(total) profit over LGT years for fleet Fl, used for evaluating
capacity change. V InFl and V
Out
Fl are the prices per unit capac-
ity of investment/disinvestment. I+Fl and I
−
Fl reflect partial ad-justment, i.e. the shares of positive respectively negative prof-
its used for investment/disinvestment in the capacity. LAGFl is
the lag in investment decision, i.e. the number of years it takes
from decision to invest/disinvest until the change is actually
put into force. PyFl is the net total profit taken by fleet segment
Fl in year y. Finally r is the interest rate and LT the expected
lifetime of a vessel. It is at present assumed that there is no
decommissioning.
In principle, the investment/disinvestment exit function
given in equation (1) is based on future expectation, but be-
cause of lack of information, past evidence in terms of profit is
used. It is assumed that the change in capacity is determined by
the opportunity cost of capital including an option for asym-
metry in entry and exit. The price of a vessel V InFl transforms
pecuniary capital into physical capital, and the reciprocal of
VOutFl includes the fishermans perception of opportunity costs(see also Bjørndal and Conrad 1987).
The next step is to determine the stock of the target species
(in the present case cod) at the beginning of year y, and set the
total allowable catch (TAC) of the species for this year. In the
present context, the stock at the beginning of each year is set
by the Pope approximation to cohort analysis (Sparre 1998):
Nya = N
y−1
a−1 · exp(−ma−1) −Cy−1a−1 · exp(−ma−1/2); y > 1 (2)
Nya is the number of cod in the stock at age a in year y. Cy−1a−1
is the number of cod caught in year y − 1 at age a − 1. ma−1
is the natural mortality of the stock at age a − 1. The number
of recruits Ny1 is set by the Ricker stock recruitment relation-
ship based on historical stock and recruitment numbers dat-
ing back to 1963 (ICES, 2006). It has been chosen to use the
Pope approximation rather than the more correct cohort equa-
tion Ny = Ny−1 ·exp (−(M + F)), as the Pope equation has also
been used to set the TAC in year y. By using this approach, in-
stead of the cohort formula, the quotas are set directly without
the need to estimate the fishing mortality rate.
While the cod SSB is below the precautionary level
SSBPa = 150 000 t, the cod quota in year y is set according to
the harvest rules stated above, i.e. the spawning stock biomass
of cod must increase by at least 30% each year until the precau-
tionary level is reached. I.e. SSBy  1.3 · SSBy−1 with SSBy =∑
a N
y
a · wa. mata, where wa and mata are the weight and frac-
tion of mature individuals at age a of the stock. Thus, the man-
agement rule states that
∑
a N
y
a · wa. mata  1.3 ·∑a Ny−1a · wa.
mata. Seeing that mat1 ∼ 0 for cod, this rule is approximately
fulfilled if Nya  1.3 · Ny−1a for a > 1. Using the Pope formula
(Eq. (2)) and rearranging, the TAC in year y must fulfil:
tacya  Nya · exp(−ma/2)−1.3 ·Nya+1 · exp(ma/2); a  1. (3)
In the present model, tacya has been set equal to the above ex-
pression when this is greater than zero, while tacya = 0 oth-
erwise. The latter case then indicates a ban of fishing cod at
certain ages, usually the young fish. Notice that tacya is defined
as the total allowable catch of cod at age a measured in number
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of cod. It is of course unrealistic to enforce age disaggregated
TACs for real, but tacya is included for modelling purposes. At
the same time, this illustrates that it may be forbidden to har-
vest cod at certain ages
When the cod SSB is higher than SSBPa it is assumed that
the aim is to keep SSBy = SSBPa. Using the above argumenta-
tion, the TAC is then set equal to:
tacya = N
y
a · exp(−ma/2) − Nya+1 · exp(ma/2); a  1. (4)
The total allowable catch (TAC) measured in weight of cod in
the North Sea in year y is then given by:
T ACy =
∑
a
tacya · wa. (5)
If all fleets sharing this TAC are able to take their full quotas
this will be equal to the catch of North Sea cod in year y, but
given the additional eﬀort restriction, the fleets may not be able
to take their full quotas, thus decreasing the actual total cod
catch in year y.
The quota for the Danish seine fleet operating in the North
Sea is given by:
QyFl=FS S Fl·CS ·T ACy ≡
∑
a
qyFl,a=
∑
a
FS S Fl ·CS · tacya · wa
(6)
CS is the country share2 of the total cod TAC, and FS S Fl is
the fleet segment share of the country quota. Both are assumed
constant in the present context. qyFl,a is defined as the quota of
cod at age a for the fleet (measured in weight), and like tacya it
is included for modelling purposes. QyFl will be the amount of
cod harvested by the fleet in year y, given that the necessary
eﬀort (number of sea days per vessel) EqyFl to take this quota
will not exceed the eﬀort limit EmaxyFl included in the recovery
scheme. EqyFl is estimated by:
EqyFl =
QyFl
NVyFl · QPUEyFl
(7)
QPUEyFl is the (quota) catch of cod per unit eﬀort (i.e. per
fishing day) and is given by:
QPUEyFl = cpue1Fl ·
(
S By
S B1
)βFl
·
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Q
y
Fl
Q1Fl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−γFl
; βFl, γFl  0
cpue1Fl =
H1Fl
NV1Fl · E1Fl
(8)
NV1Fl and E
1
Fl are the observed number of vessels and the ob-
served eﬀort (number of days at sea) used on the average per
vessel in fleet segment Fl in the start year. cpue1Fl and H
1
Fl are
the catch per unit eﬀort and total harvest of cod (measured in
weight) for the Danish seine fleet in the start year. S Byis the
stock biomass in year y given by ∑a Nya · wa. The QPUE rela-
tionship is a result of assuming that landings are determined
by the conventional economic Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion (see also Hoﬀ and Frost 2008). The Cobb-Douglas func-
tion is, among others, also applied for the harvest of cod in the
2 Also called the relative stability.
North Sea by Eide et al. (2003). Notice that the quota catch
per unit eﬀort increases with the stock, but decreases with the
quota. The latter is based on the assumption that the production
relationship between catch and eﬀort displays non-increasing
returns to scale.
The eﬀort evaluated by equation (7) may, however, exceed
the eﬀort limit EmaxyFl set by the recovery plan, and it will
thus not be possible for the fleet to harvest its total quota. If
EqyFl > Emax
y
Fl, the actual harvest of cod for the fleet segment
is estimated by scaling down the quota:
hy,aFl = q
y
Fl,a ·
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Emax
y
Fl
EqyFl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1
1+γFl
(9)
hy,aFl is the actual harvest (measured in weight) of cod at age a
taken by the fleet in year y. The scaling used in equation (9) is
derived using the QPUE relationship given in equation (8) and
demanding (i) that the number of vessels stays constant, and
(ii) that the observed eﬀort used by the fleet in year y will be
equal to EmaxyFl. The total harvest of cod in year y is H
y
Fl =∑
a h
y,a
Fl .
Finally, if the fleet is not able to catch its total quota the
cod TAC will not be fully exploited, and the actual catches
(measured in numbers) of cod in year y will then be3:
Cya = tac
y
a −
qyFl,a
wa
+
hy,aFl
wa
. (10)
The total landings value (including all species caught) RyFl of
the fleet segment in year y is given by:
RyFl =
1
CVFFl ·CCFFl
∑
a
pya ·hy,aFl ; pya = p1a ·
(
T ACy
T AC1
)α
α  0
(11)
CCFFl is the fraction which the cod harvested in the North
Sea constitutes of the total cod catch for the Danish seine fleet.
CVFFl is the fraction which the total catch value of cod (for
all fishing grounds) constitutes of the total catch value for the
Danish seine fleet. Scaling the earnings from the cod catch in
the North Sea by these two factors ensures that RyFl estimates
the total revenue of the fleet for all species caught in all oper-
ating areas.
The variable costs VCyFl and fixed costs FC
y
Fl are given by:
VCyFl = VC
1
Fl ·
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝E
y
FL · NVyFl
E1FL · NV1Fl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (12)
FCyFl = FC
1
Fl ·
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝NV
y
Fl
NV1Fl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (13)
I.e. the variable costs are scaled by the eﬀort relative to the
variable costs in year 1, and the fixed costs are scaled by the
capacity. The eﬀort EyFL used in equation (12) is the actual ef-
fort applied by the fleet in year y, i.e. EqyFl or Emax
y
Fl depend-
ing on which is the minor of the two. Finally, the total profit
taken by the fleet in year y is given by:
PyFl = R
y
Fl − VCyFl − FCyFl. (14)
3 Assuming that the part of the quota taken by other vessel groups
will be fully exploited.
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Fig. 1. Chart of the algorithm used to carry out the FLR simulation.
This brings the model back to the start, as this profit is used
in the subsequent years to assess the change of fleet capacity
(Eq. (1)) which, as it is seen by the above model, is strongly
dependent on the fleet harvest, and thus on the current man-
agement scheme.
2.1 Model implementation
The model described above has been implemented in FLR
(Fisheries Laboratory in R, Kell et al. 2007), which is a
“collection of tools in R that facilitates the construction of
bio-economic simulation models of fisheries and ecological
systems” (FLR 2007). FLR has been developed under the
6th framework programme EFIMAS (Operational Evaluation
Tools for Fisheries Management Options, EFIMAS 2007). R
is a freeware/shareware system for statistical computation and
graphics.
The simulation model runs over 10 years using a loop
which feeds results from previous years into the computations
for the year in question. As indicated above, the model meets
several branches during each yearly computation which leads
the model in diﬀerent directions. One branch is e.g. the test
whether the eﬀort needed to take the quota (Eq. (7)) is less than
the maximum eﬀort set by the management scheme. Figure 1
gives a graphical illustration of the algorithm used to carry out
the simulation in FLR.
Table 1. Initialisation data (year = 2003) for the cod stock in the
North Sea. Source: ICES (2006).
Stock Catch
numbers at numbers at Natural Catch
Age age age mortality Maturity weight at
(thousands) (thousands) age (kg)
1 89 142 8911 0.8 0.01 0.275
2 69 782 19 591 0.35 0.05 0.752
3 17 433 4621 0.25 0.23 1.533
4 9899 2729 0.2 0.62 3.191
5 1538 460 0.2 0.86 5.113
6 241 68 0.2 1 7.27
7+ 261 50 0.2 1 11.076
Table 2. Initialisation data (year = 2003) for the fleet of Danish
seiners operating in the North Sea.
Parameter Value
Number of vessels (NV1Fl) 37
Fishing days per vessel (E1Fl) 171
Variable cost for the total fleet (VC1Fl ) 8415 × 103 AC
Fixed cost for the total fleet (FC1Fl ) 3581 × 103 AC
Price per unit capacity of investment (V InFl) 350 × 103 AC
Price per unit capacity of disinvestment (VOUTFl ) 437 × 103 AC
Investment Fraction (I+Fl) 0.125
Dis-investment Fraction (I−Fl) 0.125
Lag in investment decision (LAGFl) 1 year
Number of year for averaging profit (LGT) 2 years
Discount rate (r) 5%
Expected lifetime (LT) 20 years
Catch value fraction (CVF) 0.29
Catch weight fraction (CCF) 0.61
Fleet Segment Share (FSS) 0.08
2.2 Data
The start year in the simulation is set to 2003, i.e. the year
before the cod recovery plan was set into force. The cod stock
was initialised in 2003 using cohort and catch data presented
by the ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal
Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak (ICES 2006). It is as-
sumed that the natural mortality and the maturity rate of the
stock are constant throughout the simulation period and equal
to the values also given in ICES (2006). Table 1 presents the
stock and catch data used to initialise the stock.
The Danish seine fleet operating in the North Sea is ini-
tialised using data from the Annual Economic Report on the
Economic Performance of Selected European Fishing Fleets
(AER 2004) and from the Danish Fishery Statistics. A sum-
mary of the data used to initialise the fleet in 2003 is given in
Table 2.
The maximum number of sea days in a year for a Danish
Seine vessel is set to 12× 22 = 264 days according to the CFP
eﬀort regulation. The maximum number of vessels allowed in
the fleet is set to two times the number of vessels in 2003,
i.e. to 74 vessels, thus allowing the fleet to expand if there is
positive profit. The minimum number of vessels is set to 1, thus
A. Hoﬀ and H. Frost: Aquat. Living Resour. 21, 259–264 (2008) 263
Fig. 2. Development of spawning stock biomass (SSB), stock biomass
(SB) and recruitment (R) during the simulation period.
Fig. 3. Eﬀort (number of sea days per vessel) and capacity (number
of vessels) during the simulation period for the fleet of Danish seiners
operating in the North Sea.
allowing the fleet to recover after a period of severe negative
profits4.
Finally, the Danish share (relative stability) of the North
Sea cod TAC is equal to CS CodDK = 20.45%, and the exponents
used in the CPUE evaluations have been set to βFl = 0.8 and
γFl = 1.
3 Simulation results
The model has been run from the initialisation year 2003
until 2012 which has proven to be a more than suﬃcient
time period for the stock to recover. When running the sim-
ulation with the above parameters, the stock and recruit-
ment follow the paths shown in Figure 2. It can be seen that
SSB increases above the precautionary limit of 150 000 t and
4 If the minimum number of vessels is set to zero, no earnings will
be created for the fleet in the model, and the fleet will thus never be
allowed to recover/reinvest.
Fig. 4. Variable and fixed costs (V. Cost, F. Cost), total revenues (Rev)
and total profits (Prof) during the simulation period for the fleet of
Danish seiners operating in the North Sea.
Fig. 5. Yearly cod quotas and catches during the simulation period for
the fleet of Danish seiners operating in the North Sea.
stabilises around 210 000 t. The recovery of the cod stock to
above the precautionary limit takes around 6 years.
Figure 3 shows the development in the fleet eﬀort (num-
ber of sea days per vessel) and the capacity (number of ves-
sels). Figure 4 shows the economic indicators for the fleet,
and Figure 5 shows the fleet quotas and catches during the
simulation period.
The fleet capacity decreases steeply throughout most of the
recovery period (2004 to ∼2008), but then starts to rise as the
stock recovers (Fig. 3). The cause of the initial fall in capac-
ity is the negative profit (Fig. 4) of the fleet at the beginning
of the simulation period, which, given the lag in investment
(cf. Eq. (1)), is followed by a period of disinvestment. This un-
favourable economic situation for the fleet at the beginning of
the period is caused by a combination of low quotas and se-
vere overcapacity to which disinvestment is a natural reaction.
It must, however, be kept in mind that it is probably not realis-
tic for the fleet to disinvest down to only ∼5 vessels, as many
vessels will probably choose to stay in the fishery despite the
negative earnings.
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Figure 3 also shows that the eﬀort limit of 264 days per
vessel is reached each year throughout the management period
(2004–2012), meaning that the fleet is not able to take the full
cod quota in any of the simulation years. The fleets’ catch and
quota are shown in Figure 5 where it is seen that the fraction,
which the fleet is able to take of its quota, decreases during the
simulation period. The reason for this is to be found in the de-
creasing capacity of the fleet. It has been shown by additional
simulations, that if the fleet had not been allowed to disinvest,
it would have been able to take larger parts of the yearly quota,
but with negative earnings each year due to the overcapacity.
4 Discussion and conclusion
The model and the case study presented above is naturally
a simplification of the actual dynamics between fishing biol-
ogy, management plans and economy. During the model simu-
lations it became apparent that the model is extremely sensitive
to the initialisation parameters. It is, however, still the belief of
the authors that the model gives a plausible indication of the
response of a given fleet to the changing quota situation dur-
ing a recovery scheme. It is especially interesting to follow the
response of the fleet to the additional eﬀort limitation on fish-
ing days. This is the limiting factor throughout the simulation
period for the presented case study. The simulations thus indi-
cate that it may be diﬃcult for fishing fleets to take their full
quotas if additional eﬀort limitations are set into force. This is
obviously an advantage from a biological point of view, as it
will allow the threatened stocks to recover faster, but it is quite
a disadvantage for the involved fleets.
Therefore, even though the model is a simplification of the
real world, it still gives a very detailed account of the possi-
ble response of a fishery to combined eﬀort and quota regula-
tions. As such, the value of this new model is particularly to be
found in the fact that it provides stakeholders with additional
socio-economic information about the possible eﬀects of new
management regimes including eﬀort regulation. It should be
clear that the model can be extended to more fleets and more
species, and that the model as such is a valuable addition to the
ongoing research in the evaluation of management schemes.
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